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Abstract—A hybrid voting system allows voters to revoke their
electronic vote at the polling station. This approach is meant
to provide full individual and universal verifiability without
introducing the threats of vote buying or voter coercion. Such an
integration of traditional and electronic voting systems requires
the voters’ ability to prove whether they have already voted
electronically, and if so, to show which of all the electronic votes
published on the public bulletin board is theirs.
This paper proposes in full cryptographic detail a novel e-
voting protocol that allows voters to unambiguously show and
prove to voting officials at the polling station if they have cast an
electronic vote. If this is the case, the voters can use their secret
credentials to locate their votes on the public bulletin board
without giving up the secrecy of the credentials. Remarkably,
our protocol enables them to do so, even if their votes have been
cast by a third party that got hold of their credentials. We thus
address the hardest possible attack on a voter’s right to vote.
Furthermore, unlike pure e-voting systems, our protocol allows
the hybrid system to provide coercion-resistance even when voters
are allowed to vote for write-in candidates.
Our approach is meant to appeal to governments that aim at
offering voters the choice between two channels for casting votes,
rather than fully replacing their traditional paper-based voting
scheme with an e-voting system.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In consideration of the complexity and manifold vulnera-
bilities of today’s computers and networks, most governments
pursue a cautious strategy in introducing electronic means into
processes that are so fundamental for running their democracy.
Their reservation is particularly distinctive if the technology
involves components that are not under their control. The num-
ber of countries experimenting with electronic voting over the
Internet is therefore still marginal. Estonia and Switzerland,
two of the few pioneering countries in Internet elections and
referendums (we shall use the general term voting), follow
the strategy to slowly increase the number of electronic votes
over the years [1]. The idea behind keeping this shift at a
slow pace is to limit the risk and consequences of fraud in
the early stage of the respective project. The legitimacy of
such concerns has been demonstrated by the negative e-voting
experience in the Netherlands, where all nationwide e-voting
activities have been stopped in 2007, after the vulnerability of
1Research supported by the Hasler Foundation (project No. 09037) and the
Mittelbaufo¨rderung of the Bern University of Applied Sciences.
the deployed system had been exposed in public [2]. In the
foreseeable future, traditional and electronic voting systems
are therefore expected to live side by side for quite some time.
In this paper we introduce a protocol which is applicable to
that very setting.
Offering the voting community two channels for casting
their votes requires some care. Clearly, a mechanism is re-
quired to prevent voters from casting multiple votes, particu-
larly one vote per channel. A voting system that complies with
this minimal requirement we call integrated voting system. To
find acceptance among voters, a new integrated voting system
should at least level with the security standards of the existing
voting system. Note, that the security level of an integrated
voting system is directly determined by the weaker of its sub-
systems.
In Section II, we show the requirements on e-voting systems
as they are commonly postulated. We explain why it is
so difficult to offer coercion-resistance with pure e-voting
systems [3]. Since an electronic sub-system vulnerable to
coercion would clearly undermine the security level of the
overall integrated system, we proposed in [4] the concept
of a hybrid voting system, in which voters are allowed to
revoke their electronic votes at the polling station. For this, we
require the electronic component of a hybrid voting system
to hold properties that differ from the ones of a pure e-
voting system. The notion of hybrid voting systems thus opens
new possibilities for protocol designers. Remarkably, coercion-
resistance is an inherent consequence of the definition of
hybrid systems.
In Section III and Section IV, we present a novel e-voting
protocol that can be used as the electronic sub-system of a
hybrid system. It is based on an anonymous authentication
mechanism and guarantees that the voters are always able to
unambiguously locate their votes on the public bulletin board
during the revocation procedure. An overview of the protocol
is given in Section III, and the corresponding formal details
are provided in Section IV. In Section V, we show that the
protocol satisfies the corresponding requirements as described
in Section II, and Section VI concludes the paper.
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II. HYBRID VOTING SYSTEMS
A functioning democracy depends on its citizens’ trust in
their political voting system. This applies to remote electronic
voting systems which allow voters to cast their votes through
the Internet, just as much as to their traditional paper-based
counterparts. In both cases, citizens must be convinced that the
system is sufficiently secure and invulnerable. Subsection II-A
introduces and explains the requirements on e-voting systems
that are often postulated. They are directly derived from tradi-
tional paper-based voting systems that are usually considered
to be sufficiently secure and trustworthy. In Subsection II-B,
we discuss the difficulty of offering coercion-resistance with
pure e-voting systems, and in Subsection II-C, we show how
to overcome that problem with hybrid voting systems.
A. Requirements on E-Voting Systems
For an e-voting system to be secure, it has to be imple-
mented according to an intrinsically secure design. Despite
the complexity of designing and implementing such a system,
some criteria seem to be unanimously accepted as the core
security requirements for e-voting systems [5], [6].
• Accuracy: A system is accurate if votes cast can not be
altered (integrity), valid votes can not be eliminated from
the final tally (completeness), and invalid votes are not
counted in the final tally (soundness).
• Democracy: A system is democratic if only authorized
voters can vote (eligibility) and authorized voters can only
vote once (uniqueness).
• Privacy: A system is private if no vote cast can be linked
to its voter, neither by voting authorities nor anyone else
(anonymity), and no voter can prove that he or she voted
in a particular way (receipt-freeness).
• Verifiability: A system is individually verifiable if voters
can independently verify that their own votes have been
counted correctly in the final tally. A system is universally
verifiable, if voters can independently verify that all votes
cast have been counted correctly in the final tally.
• Fairness: A system is fair if no intermediate results can
be obtained before the voting period ends.
• Coercion-Resistance: A system is coercion-resistant if it
is immune against vote buying and voter coercion.
The terms coercion-resistance, vote buying and voter co-
ercion, as well as the reasons why they have caused severe
headaches among protocol designers are further elaborated in
the next subsection.
B. Coercion-Resistance versus Individual Verifiability
Whether or not a system has actually implemented required
security features is not necessarily evident to the voters. If
they feel that their votes may not even reach the final tally,
they might fully restrain from voting electronically and tend to
cast their votes in the traditional way, a means of casting votes
still likely to be available in the near future. By doing so, they
witness the vote reaching the body of the possibly transparent
ballot-box. Some countries even allow voters to attend the
tallying procedure and thus to witness the consideration of
their votes in the final outcome. To establish a similar level of
voters’ trust in e-voting systems, it is imperative to give them
access to some information that confirms the correct casting of
their votes in a convincing way. This confirmation is meant to
provide aforementioned individual verifiability, a precondition
to trustworthiness of voting systems. The existence of such a
confirmation may thus seem like a feature, but since it will
generally also convince any third party that a particular vote
was cast, it disallows voters to deceive others about their
votes. Such information is thus called a voter’s receipt [7].
Its existence is a violation of the voter’s privacy, because it
opens doors to the following two types of fraud, in which the
adversary gets the voter to vote in a prescribed way [8].
• Vote Buying: The voter will be rewarded by the vote buyer
for voting in a particular manner. To receive the reward,
the voter might actively co-operate with the vote buyer,
e.g. by deviating from the normal voting procedure to
construct a receipt.
• Voter Coercion: The voter is threatened by a coercer to
vote in a particular manner. Here, the voter will only
consent to co-operate with the coercer as long as the
threat is perceived as real.
Note, that both forms of exploiting a voting system are
largely scalable in an electronic environment. A vote buyer
could simply set up a web site explaining the conditions for
making easy money, while a coercer could easily post his
threats to thousands of voters. In both cases, the attack is only
interesting to potential adversaries as long as voters are able
to prove them how they voted. Without a receipt, a corrupted
voter could simply lie about the vote cast, i.e., the motivation
of an adversary even launching such an attack in the first place
is likely to be as low as with paper-based votes.
Clearly, it must be a primary objective to establish an e-
voting system that is immune to all sorts of vote buying and
voter coercion attacks, including those in which the adversary
gets the voter to abstain from voting or to vote at random.
Systems blessed with that immunity are called coercion-
resistant [3], [9]. Note that coercion-resistance is stronger
than mere receipt-freeness [7], [10], which alone does not
prevent adversaries from getting voters to abstain from voting.
In the literature, there are many suggestions for receipt-free or
coercion-resistant systems, but most of them rely on unrealistic
technical assumptions [7], [9], [11]–[17].
C. Hybrid Voting Systems
Apart from receipt-freeness and thus coercion-resistance,
the core security requirements as listed in Subsection II-A are
addressed to a satisfactory degree by various known e-voting
protocols. However, banning receipts from their systems to al-
low coercion-resistance, without compromising the inevitable
individual verifiability, poses a great challenge and may even
seem to be inherently infeasible at first sight. Yet, [3] proposes
a system to solve just that problem. However, the scheme
raises a few new technical questions that remain unanswered.
Further, the scheme only grants for coercion-resistance in the
case of referendums or elections with only few candidates to
choose from. If many candidates are eligible or if even write-
ins are permitted, the decrypted vote will serve the voter as a
receipt after tallying and thus subjects him to voter coercion
and vote buying.
Hybrid voting systems on the contrary are designed to offer
coercion-resistance in every thinkable mode of voting [4].
This is achieved by allowing voters to revoke their votes in
the protecting environment of a polling station and replace
it with a new, independent vote using the traditional paper-
based voting channel. This approach enables individual voters
to express their actual, unbiased political opinion.
If adversaries must assume that corrupted voters will usually
revoke their votes, a hybrid system clearly provides coercion-
resistance: an attack would simply seem too expensive. We
believe that it is possible for governments to invoke that per-
ception among adversaries, for instance by explicitly allowing
voters to co-operate with vote buyers and coercers, however
only as long as they revoke their biased vote.
In order for an e-voting protocol to define the electronic
channel of a hybrid system, it needs to comply with the
following requirements:
• Proof of Eligibility: Registered voters that abstained from
casting an electronic vote need to be able to unam-
biguously prove to the voting officials that they are
still eligible for casting their vote.2 Assuming that the
electronic voting phase ends before the traditional polling
stations open, the minimal requirement for an integrated
system is thus fulfilled.
• Proof of Vote Ownership: If their vote has been cast,
voters need to be able to prove ownership of their
(encrypted) electronic vote in the electronic ballot-box.
In the following sections, we present a protocol that satisfies
these requirements. To satisfy Proof of Vote Ownership, the
protocol guarantees that voters own respective receipts for the
votes they own.3 Notably, by requiring instead of banning
receipts, we sharply depart from the mainstream approach
of taking additional measures to make electronic voting sys-
tems receipt-free as a precondition to coercion-resistance.4
We rather argue that the guaranteed existence of a receipt
within the e-voting system allows coercion-resistance of the
embedding hybrid system.
2By a voter’s vote we consistently refer to the vote that was cast using his
credentials. We say the credentials belong to the owner of the vote. We hereby
address the situation where an adversary, for instance a vote buyer, gets hold
of a voter’s credentials.
3Two different revocation procedures are given in [4]. Since the protocol
that we present here guarantees a receipt to vote owners, it allows the
application of both procedures. By only requiring a vote identifier at revocation
time, revocation is restricted to Procedure 1. Remarkably, small changes to the
protocol introduce new features while still guaranteeing a vote identifier to
vote owners. Particularly, a derivative of that protocol could offer a re-voting
feature (last vote counts), which corresponds with the voting tradition of the
Nordic countries.
4Due to the difficulty of excluding receipts from e-voting systems, many
proposed systems simply accept the presence of receipts, hence their exposure
to coercion and vote buying attacks. However, they generally only guarantee
the ownership of a receipt to the party who cast the vote, not the owner of
the vote. Thus, these systems will not meet this requirement.
III. PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
In this section, we give a first overview of the proposed
protocol. In Subsection III-A, we briefly discuss the crypto-
graphic building blocks that are put to use, and in Subsection
III-B, we give a high-level, informal description of the full
protocol. This introductory subsection should motivate the
thorough definitions of the protocol in Section IV and thus
facilitate the reader’s first approach.
A. Cryptographic Building Blocks
The protocol assumes several modern cryptographic
building blocks. Apart from standard ElGamal encryp-
tion/decryption, we also need threshold cryptosystems, non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, anonymous
authentication, mix networks, and anonymous channels. Some
of these building blocks will be briefly described below.
ElGamal Cryptosystem: The ElGamal cryptosystem is
based on a multiplicative cyclic group (G, ·) of finite order q,
for which the computational and the decisional Diffie-Hellman
assumptions are believed to hold. The most common choice for
such a group is a subgroup Gq ⊆ Z∗p of order q = (p− 1)/k,
where p and q are large primes. The public parameters of an
ElGamal cryptosystem are then p, q, and a generator g of Gq.
An ElGamal key pair is a tuple (d, e), where the d ∈R Zq
is the randomly chosen private key and e = gd ∈ Gq the
corresponding public key. If M ∈ G denotes the message to
encrypt, then the pair (x, y) = (gk,M ·ek) is the encryption of
M with randomness k ∈ Zq. For a given ElGamal encryption
(x, y), M can be recovered by computing M = yxd .
Threshold Cryptosystems: A cryptosystem such as ElGamal
is called threshold (t, n)-cryptosystem, if the private key to
decrypt the message is shared among n parties, and if the
number of parties required to cooperate in the decryption
protocol exceeds a certain threshold t < n. A threshold version
of the ElGamal cryptosystem results from sharing the private
key with Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. To avoid a trusted
third party to generate the private key shares, it is possible to
let the n parties execute a distributed key generation protocol
[18].
Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge: A zero-knowledge
proof allows a party to demonstrate to another party that a
mathematical statement is true, but without revealing anything
other than the truth of the statement itself. A particular class of
zero-knowledge proofs are so-called proofs of knowledge, in
which the prover demonstrates knowledge of the preimage ω
of a public value x = φ(ω), where φ : G → H is a candidate
one-way function. Such proofs can be constructed as non-
interactive Σ-protocols, if φ is a homomorphism with a finite
domain [19]. Two of the simplest and most frequently used
instances of such Σ-protocols are the proof of knowledge of
a discrete logarithm ω = logg x in a multiplicative group G
of finite order q with generator g [20], or similarly, the proof
of equality of two discrete logarithms ω = logg x = logh y,
where h is another generator of G [21]. In this paper, we
use mere ZKP -notation to express that a non-interactive Σ-
protocol is used as a means of proving. Moreover, ZKP -
notation expresses what is being proved. To prove the equality
of two discrete logarithms, for instance as mentioned above,
we would write ZKP
￿
(ω) : (x= gω) ∧ (y=hω)￿. More
generally, Σ-protocols can be used to prove knowledge of
preimages in zero-knowledge, that satisfies any composition of
equations as in the example above, i.e., connected by logical
∧ or ∨. Since ZKP -notation is understood intuitively, we do
not give a formal definition here.
Anonymous Channels: An anonymous channel hides the
correspondence between senders and their messages, i.e., the
senders of the messages remain anonymous or untraceable.
The most common realization of anonymous channels is based
on mix nets [22]. A mix net consists of a sequence of servers,
each of which receives a batch of input messages and produces
a batch of output messages in a permuted (mixed) order.
Public Bulletin Board: A public bulletin board is a broad-
cast channel with memory. This means that everybody is
allowed to append new entries and to read its content, but
nobody is allowed to delete or to modify existing entries.
Such a bulletin board may have the additional functionality
of filtering out invalid or double entries, for example by
checking the validity of an attached digital signature or proof
of knowledge. The bulletin boards can be replicated in order
to prevent them from being potential single points of failure.
B. Protocol Overview
• Generation of Public and Secret Credentials: As a pre-
condition to a voting process, the protocol assumes the
existence of a publicly readable voter roll. It can be
thought of as a list that identifies all eligible voters. Each
voter is assigned a public credential and the matching
secret credential. The credential is kept secret by the
voter. These values can be reused across multiple vot-
ing processes. A voter’s public credential is associated
with his entry in the voter roll and published. Without
disclosing it, voters can prove that they own the secret
credential that matches their public credential using a
non-interactive Σ-protocol. On the other hand, it is com-
putationally infeasible to calculate the secret credential
that matches a voter’s public credential.
• Generation of Pseudonyms: Given the list of public
credentials as input, a publicly readable list of shuffled
pseudonyms is generated before every voting event. Simi-
larly as with public credentials, voters can prove that they
own the secret credentials that match their pseudonyms.
On the other hand, it is computationally infeasible to
calculate the secret credential that matches a voter’s
pseudonym. Associating public credentials with their cor-
responding pseudonym is computationally only feasible
when knowing the corresponding secret credential.
• Vote Casting: Voters use their credential to compute
their pseudonym, the encryption of their vote, and a
zero-knowledge proof that they have done so correctly,
i.e., using the credential that matches the pseudonym
in both computations. Clearly, only voters who know
the credential that matches a pseudonym can do so.
The pseudonym, the encrypted vote, and the proof are
posted to the public bulletin board through an anonymous
channel. If the proof holds against the sent values and if
the supplied pseudonym is an element of the shuffled
list, the vote and the proof are published on the board.
By associating their vote with their pseudonyms, which
is only possible when knowing the corresponding secret
credential, voters authenticate themselves as eligible vot-
ers without disclosing their identity.5
• Proofs of Eligibility and Ownership: As described in
Subsection II-C, the protocol must enable voters to prove
that they have not cast an electronic vote. If they have
cast an electronic vote, they must be able to identify
the vote they have cast and prove their ownership. Both
requirements are satisfied by the knowledge of their secret
credential. At the polling station, voters authenticate
themselves and identify their public credential on the
public bulletin board. Further, they reveal the pseudonym
that corresponds with their public credential and present
a zero-knowledge proof to show that they have presented
the correct pseudonym.6 They can only do so using their
secret credential. If there is no vote associated with that
pseudonym, voters have proven their eligibility to cast
their vote using the traditional paper-based infrastructure
without prior revocation. If there is a vote associated
with the pseudonym, the voter has proven ownership of
that vote, i.e., to cast another vote using the paper-based
infrastructure, it must first be revoked by following a
revocation procedure described in [4].
IV. DETAILED PROTOCOL DEFINITION
We divide the protocol into eight different steps, of which
the first two need not to be repeated for every voting event.
A. Setup
The protocol involves four groups of players, each of
which is responsible for designated tasks as described in the
following subsections.
1) The group of eligible voters V = {V1, . . . , Vm}, none
of which are are assumed to be trustworthy.
2) The group of registrars R = {R1, . . . , Rnr}, of which
at least tr ≤ nr are assumed to be trustworthy.
3) The group of pseudonym producers P = {P1, . . . , Pnp},
of which at least tp ≤ np are assumed to be trustworthy.
4) The group of talliers T = {T1, . . . , Tnt}, of which at
least tt ≤ nt are assumed to be trustworthy.
We collectively refer to registrars, pseudonym producers,
and talliers by the term voting authorities.7 Any intersection
5In the literature, this concept is sometimes called anonymous authentica-
tion [23], [24].
6Simply revealing the credential would compensate for the zero-knowledge
proof. However, in that case voters would need to be assigned a new pair of
public and secret credentials to meet the privacy requirement in subsequent
voting events.
7For the sake of simplicity, we assume the members of voting authorities
to be individuals. In reality, each group member could be an independent
organization.
of groups can be non-void. Particularly, voters can work as
registrars, pseudonym producers, or talliers at the same time.
To simplify the formal notation, we assume that the size of
each voting authority group is equal to n and that at least t ≤ n
of their members are trustworthy (n = nr = np = nt and
t = tr = tp = tt). Additionally, we assume that the threshold
t of trustworthy authorities is strictly greater than n2 (this is
the best achievable threshold for a solution that provides both
secrecy and robustness). Finally, we assume the presence of
adversaries without explicitly formalizing them as a group.
Suppose that the voting authorities have agreed on a gen-
erator g of a subgroup Gq ⊆ Z∗p of order q, such that p and
q = (p− 1)/k are large primes (so-called safe primes). These
values are used across multiple voting events.
We further assume the existence of a voter roll, an initially
empty public bulletin board as a public communication chan-
nel, and an anonymous channel for casting the votes.
B. Generation of Public and Secret Credentials:
Objective: Vi knows his secret credential si and the corre-
sponding public credential Si = gsi is published on the public
bulletin board. These values can be reused across multiple
voting events. Eligible voters are thus registered for e-voting.
Definition: For each is eligible voter Vi ∈ V , the registrars
R jointly create Vi’s public credential Si = gsi and publish
it on the public bulletin board associated with his entry in the
voter roll. This can be done using a distributed key generation
protocol as proposed in [18], where the knowledge of si is
shared among the members of R such that at least t shares
are required to compute si. The members of R pass their
shares of si to Vi through a sufficiently secure channel (we
assume that at least t members will do so). This could for
example be done through the postal system or by Vi showing
up at the registration offices for in-person authentication. The
received shares allow Vi to efficiently compute si.
C. Generation of Pseudonyms
Objective: For every Vi ∈ V , the pseudonym Sˆπ(i) = gˆsi is
published at position π(i) on the public bulletin board. gˆ ∈ Z∗p
is the so-called pseudonym generator and π is an unknown
permutation of {1, . . . ,m}. This step is conducted prior to
every voting event.
Definition: Define g0 := g and S0 = (S0,1, . . . , S0,m) :=
(S1, . . . , Sm). Taking g0 and S0 as input, P1 is responsible for
the creation and publishing of g1 and S1 = (S1,1, . . . , S1,m)
according to the details given below. If the output of P1
is verifiably correct, then P2 uses it for the creation of g2
and S2 = (S2,1, . . . , S2,m), and so on for all pseudonym
producers Pj ∈ P . At the end of the chain, Pn outputs the
resulting pseudonym generator gˆ := gn and the permuted
list of pseudonyms Sˆ := Sn = (Sn,1, . . . , Sn,m), which
contains Vi’s pseudonym Sˆπ(i) = Sn,π(i) at position π(i).
The permutation π = πn ◦ · · · ◦ π1 is the result of a sequence
of individual permutations πj , where Pj is responsible for
selecting πj . In the ideal case, in which all n pseudonym
producers publish verifiably correct outputs, we obtain thus the
following two chains of public values on the public bulletin
board:
g = g0 → g1 → g2 → · · · → gn = gˆ,
S = S0 → S1 → S2 → · · · → Sn = Sˆ.
To produce gj and Sj from gj−1 and Sj−1, respectively, Pj
chooses αj ∈R Zq and πj uniformly at random to compute
gj = g
αj
j−1,
Sj,πj(i) = S
αj
j−1,i,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Obviously, this implies gˆ = gα1···αn
and thus
Sˆπ(i) = Sα1···αni = (g
si)α1···αn = (gα1···αn)si = gˆsi ,
which means that the pseudonyms are evidently generated as
intended. Note that Vi can independently compute Sˆπ(i) =
gˆsi using the public pseudonym generator gˆ and the secret
credential si (see Subsection IV-E).
To avoid that the pseudonym producers deviate from the
protocol by not choosing the values αj uniformly at random,
we ask them to select αj and publish Aj = gαj prior to the
pseudonym generation process. Thus, value Aj serves as Pj’s
commitment to αj .
Finally, to ensure that the output of each pseudonym pro-
ducer Pj ∈ P is verifiably correct, it must be equipped with a
corresponding zero-knowledge proof of correctness Zj . This
proof includes three components, one that proves conformity
with the commitment Aj , one that proves the correct compu-
tation of gj , and one that proves correct shuffling. Algorithm
1 shows all the details of what Pj needs to do (assuming that
gj−1 and Sj−1 are correct inputs).
Algorithm 1 Calculate gj , Sj , Zj
Require: gj−1, Sj−1, αj , Aj
gj ← gαjj−1
πj ← random permutation of {1, . . . ,m}
Sj ← initialize as m-ary vector
for all i = 1, . . . ,m do
Sj,πj(i) ← Sαjj−1,i
end for
Zj ← ZKP
￿
(αj) : (Aj = gαj ) ∧ (gj = gαjj−1) ∧
(
￿m
k=1
￿m
i=1 Sj,i = S
αj
j−1,k)
￿
Post gj , Sj , Zj to public bulletin board, keep αj , πj secret
For the sake of simplicity, we assumed in Algorithm 1 that
all previous pseudonym producers P1, . . . , Pj−1 have correctly
fulfilled their tasks and that the input parameters gj−1 and
Sj−1 have thus been computed correctly from g0 and S0. By
withdrawing this assumption, i.e., by considering the situation
where pseudonym producers do miscomputations, choose in-
correct inputs, or produce any other type of incorrect outputs,
Pj would need to verify all existing proofs Z1 to Zj−1 before
executing Algorithm 1. Then, instead of simply taking the
outputs of Pj−1 as input, Pj selects the greatest value k < j
such that correct proofs exist for Pk and all its predecessors.
Additionally, Pj needs to check that every P￿ involved in the
chain of correct proofs (i.e., from gk and Sk back to g0 and
S0, respectively) has correctly followed this rule for selecting
the input parameters. Note that the same selection rule must
be applied at the end of the pseudonymization process for the
selection of gˆ and Sˆ (instead of simply taking gn and Sn). The
length of the corresponding chain of proofs must be greater
than or equal to the specified threshold t.
A problem of Algorithm 1 in its simple description is the
size of the involved proof, which grows quadratically with the
number of voters. As a counter-measure, we may break up
the input vector Sk (and thus Sj) into mb sub-vectors of size b
(suppose m is a multiple of b). Algorithm 1 can then process
each of these sub-vectors individually. This reduces the size
of the involved proofs and therefore the total running time
of Algorithm 1 from O(m2) to O(m·b). For a fixed value b,
the whole pseudonymization procedure runs then in O(m·n)
time.8
D. Key Generation for Vote Encryption and Tallying
Objective: For vote encryption and tallying, corresponding
keys of a secure (t, n)-threshold ElGamal cryptosystem are
generated. The private key d is shared among the members of
T and the corresponding public key e is published. This step
is conducted prior to every voting event.
Definition: An appropriate protocol for secure distributed
key generation based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme [25]
is proposed in [18]. To apply it in the context of our e-voting
protocol, we need a second generator h ∈R Gq \ {1} of the
same subgroup Gq, which is jointly selected at random by
the members of T .9 At the end of the protocol, a public key
e = hd ∈ Gq is published. The corresponding private key
d ∈R Zq is shared among the members of T and can only
be computed by a coalition of size t or greater. Any smaller
coalition has no advantage over a single adversary who tries
to compute d from h and e without owning a share. Parties
that deviate from the key generation protocol will be detected
and disqualified by the others.
E. Vote Casting
Objective: An ElGamal encryption wi = (xi, yi) of vote vi
is cast to the public bulletin board along with a proof to show
that its owner is an eligible voter who owns a receipt.
8To guarantee a sufficiently large space of possible permutations over
{1, . . . ,m} even for a small value b (e.g. b = 2), we may apply some
prescribed pattern to assign different sets of sub-vectors to each pseudonym
producer. In this way, up to (b!)
m·n
b different random permutations are
possible and equally likely. For example, b = 2 yields (
√
2)m·n possible
permutations. This number is far less than m!, the number of all permutations
over {1, . . . ,m}, but still large enough for a sufficiently randomized shuffling
(exponential in both m and n).
9Particularly, logg(h) needs to be unknown, because otherwise adversaries
could link votes to their owners (see vote casting step as given in Subsection
IV-E). As described in [18], a generic distributed coin flipping protocol can
be applied to serve that purpose.
Definition: Voter Vi calculates the pseudonym Sˆπ(i) = gˆsi
and the ElGamal encryption wi = (xi, yi) = (hsi , vi·esi)
of the vote vi. It is crucial that si is used as the ElGa-
mal randomness (see Subsection IV-F). Using the pseudonym
generator gˆ, the voter further computes a zero-knowledge
proof zi = ZKP
￿
(si) : (Sˆπ(i)= gˆsi) ∧ (xi=hsi)
￿
and then
posts (Sˆπ(i), wi, zi) to the public bulletin board through an
anonymous channel. The vote cast is accepted and published
on the board, if Sˆπ(i) is a valid pseudonym enlisted in Sˆ and
if the verification of zi yields true.10 If several votes are cast
under the same pseudonym, only one of them is kept according
to some policy. Note that the procedure so far guarantees
that the encrypted vote wi is verifiably owned by an eligible
voter, since only members of the voter roll are assigned a
pseudonym. Subsection IV-F shows how Vi can use si to prove
ownership of the vote and that si is actually a receipt.
F. Proofs of Eligibility and Ownership
Objective: Vi is able to either prove not having cast a vote
or to identify the encrypted vote wi = (xi, yi) on the public
bulletin board. If necessary, Vi may even be able to verifiably
disclose vi (e.g. with regard to the possible application of the
second revocation procedure described in [4]).
Definition: The voting officials identify the public credential
Si on the public bulletin board as Vi authenticates at the
polling station. Vi then reveals the pseudonym Sˆπ(i) together
with ZKP
￿
(si) : (Si= gsi) ∧ (Sˆπ(i)=(gˆsi)
￿
as a proof of
correctness. If on the public bulletin board there is no vote
associated with Sˆπ(i), Vi has proven the eligibility to cast a
paper vote. Otherwise, Vi is clearly the owner of the encrypted
vote associated with Sˆπ(i).
If the applied revocation procedure requires vi to be re-
vealed, Vi can use the secret credential si as a receipt to
present ZKP
￿
(si) : (xi=hsi) ∧ (yivi = esi)
￿
. This proves that
vi has been revealed truthfully. By previously handing out si to
a coercer, Vi might not know vi, but it can easily be calculated
as yiesi . Due to the zero-knowledge property of Σ-protocols, the
credential si can be reused for subsequent voting events.
G. Tallying
Objective: The result of the tally is published and provably
correct.
Definition: At least t members of T publicly reveal their
share of d and prove having done so correctly according to
[18]. Now anybody could efficiently calculate d using any set
of at least t shares, and decrypt all votes cast to compute the
final outcome of the voting event.11
V. DISCUSSION
In its hybrid context, we relate the protocol as defined in
the previous section to the requirements on e-voting systems
as presented in Subsection II-A.
10The board may also publish all incoming posts and delegate the verifica-
tion and filtering to the talliers.
11In practice, the authorities could be responsible for the decryption, and
everybody could verify that they have done so correctly.
A. Accuracy
Given that votes reach the public bulletin board in an
unchanged state, the integrity, completeness and soundness
requirements are trivially met by an appropriate definition
of the public bulletin board and the fact that votes can be
decrypted by any observing party at tallying-time. However,
voters are required to verify that their votes actually reach
the public bulletin board in an unchanged state and to react
accordingly otherwise, i.e. by resending or even revoking their
vote.12
B. Democracy
Eligible voters are assigned a public credential and a
pseudonym. By the definition of the pseudonym generation
process, anybody can verify that each eligible voter is as-
signed his designated unique pseudonym correctly. Assigning
pseudonyms to citizens not enlisted in the voter roll is clearly
impossible. Thus the requirement eligibility is met.
Given that votes need to be publicly associated with a
pseudonym, multiple voting is excluded, thus uniqueness is
achieved.
C. Privacy
The requirement anonymity is achieved if a vote cannot be
linked back to its owner. By sending their vote through the
anonymous channel and relating it to their pseudonym, voters
anonymously authenticate as eligible voters without disclosing
their identity. Thus, the votes are detached from their senders.
For anonymity to hold, we additionally need to rely on
the assumption that pseudonyms cannot be efficiently linked
back to their corresponding public credential. Given that at
least two members from the group of pseudonym produc-
ers P withhold their secret value αj used at pseudonym
generation, this assumption is strongly related with the De-
cision Diffie-Hellman Assumption DDH.13 Given any two
vectors Sk,S￿ and respective values gk, g￿, where k < ￿
and αk+1 · · ·α￿ = loggk(g￿) is unknown, DDH inherently
yields that it is computationally hard to identify Sk,w for
12Vote revocation without coercion would be necessary, for instance when
assuming the presence of malware running on voters’ platforms that may
exploit the malleability property of the ElGamal cryptosystem to modify the
vote. The presence of malware may also affect the protocol’s performance
with regard to the privacy and fairness requirements. Although we could
suggest some modifications to the protocol to tackle some of the security
concerns, it seems that privacy cannot be guaranteed when assuming untrusted
platforms. However, this problem applies to all internet applications and is
not specific to e-voting. Accordingly, we assume that voters own a trusted
device for doing sensitive computations. This could indeed be realized by
exporting the computations related to vote encryption to a smartcard and
sending a non-malleable encryption of the encrypted vote and the proof to
the electronic ballot-box. Thus, phishing attacks are avoided and votes would
reach the public bulletin board in an unchanged state. Nevertheless, the voter
would need to check that the vote cast reaches the public bulletin board when
assuming unreliable anonymous channels.
13The decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) states that it is compu-
tationally hard to distinguish the triples (ga, gb, gab) and (ga, gb, gc), where
a, b, c are chosen at random from Zq and Gq is a finite cyclic group of order
q generated by g. Although this is not generally true, DDH is believed to
hold if Gq is chosen as the q-order subgroup of Z∗p generated by g, such that
p and q = (p− 1)/k are large primes. This restriction corresponds with the
suggested settings in this paper.
given S￿,v , such that S￿,v = S
αk+1···α￿
k,w holds. Particularly,
given the full list of pseudonyms, it is infeasible to identify
the pseudonym Sˆπ(i) that corresponds with a given public
credential Si and vice-versa. Further, it seems that an attacker
strategy to apply appropriate transformations to votes cast
and any combination of lists S0, . . . ,Sn as well as respective
g0, . . . , gn to reproduce the applied permutations, would yet
require DDH to break.
As mentioned above, we do not address the possibility of
phishing attacks on a protocol level. We find this justified
by the fact that the issue is not specific to e-voting and that
we have no knowledge of an existing e-voting protocol that
provides privacy under the presence of malware. However,
we believe that the problem can be solved to a satisfying
degree on an implementation level of the protocol, namely
by using trusted offline devices, possibly based on smart-card
technology, for critical computations. We consider the fact that
the protocol allows to be implemented in a secure way to yield
anonymity as a quality attribute.
In pure e-voting systems, the requirement receipt-freeness is
stated as a precondition to coercion-resistance. In Subsection
II-C we argue why hybrid voting systems offer coercion-
resistance by definition. Further, we argue why e-voting sys-
tems that guarantee a receipt to vote owners are candidates
for being used as the electronic sub-component of a hybrid
context. Therefore, the protocol is actually designed to offer
receipts to vote-owners.
D. Verifiability
Using the secret credential si and the public values of the
ElGamal PKI, voter Vi can re-calculate the encryption of vi
and verify that it is shown on the the public bulletin board.
For tallying, at least t talliers of T reveal their share of their
group’s private key d, and prove having done so correctly. The
talliers then publish d, use it to decrypt each vote, and publish
the plaintext votes associated with their encryption and the
pseudonym of their owner. Thus, voter Vi can verify that the
vote is decrypted correctly. Since it can be verified that the
talliers have revealed their shares truthfully, Vi can calculate
d and use it to decrypt all votes. By comparing the tally of
the decrypted votes with the published tally, Vi knows that
all votes (including vi) have been counted correctly. Thus, the
requirements individual verifiability and universal verifiability
are met.
Relating the plaintext votes to their encryption and their
owner’s pseudonym, even after tallying, creates the highest
possible sense of trust among voters regarding the accuracy
of the tally. This is particularly relevant considering the
majority of voters who do not have the background it takes
to understand a potentially complex tallying procedure that
detaches plaintext votes from their encryptions.
E. Fairness
Fairness is achieved by leaving the plaintexts of the en-
crypted votes unrevealed until the polls are closed. Recall that
it takes at least t members of T to decrypt votes. By assuming
the number of untrusted members smaller than t, as stated in
Subsection IV-A, the event of premature decryption of votes
is ruled out, and thus the fairness requirement is met.
F. Coercion-Resistance
As shown in Subsection IV-F, the protocol meets the re-
quirements imposed on the electronic sub-component of a
hybrid voting system. The definition of a hybrid voting system
directly yields coercion-resistance, as explained in Subsection
II-C.
VI. CONCLUSION
Governments will not immediately replace their traditional
paper-based voting scheme with a pure internet e-voting sys-
tem. Instead, both voting channels will need to be integrated.
We exploit this natural setting to propose hybrid systems to
overcome the danger of vote buying and voter coercion to
which integrated voting systems are subjected. Thus, voters
can trust the published outcome of votes as reflecting the
actual, unbiased political preference of the voting community
as a whole.
We have shown that the presented protocol satisfies the
requirements on the electronic subsystem of a hybrid voting
system. Moreover, it provides the key requirements expected
from a voting system: Accuracy, democracy, privacy, verifiabil-
ity and fairness are achieved even if the protocol is applied in a
stand-alone voting system. It also provides coercion-resistance,
when operated in its hybrid context.
The protocol will most likely create a high degree of
trust regarding the correctness of the published vote outcome.
Voters do not need to be proficient in any cryptographic basics.
Just by seeing their pseudonym associated with their decrypted
vote on the public bulletin board, they will know that their vote
has been counted correctly.
REFERENCES
[1] Die Bundesbeho¨rden der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, “Bericht
u¨ber den vote e´lectronique: Chancen, risiken und machbarkeit elektro-
nischer ausu¨bung politischer rechte,” Bundesblatt, vol. 154, no. 5, pp.
645–700, 2002.
[2] L. Loeber, “E-voting in the Netherlands: from general acceptance to
general doubt in two years,” in 3nd International Workshop on Electronic
Voting, ser. Lecture Notes in Informatics, R. Krimmer and R. Grimm,
Eds. Bregenz, Austria: Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik E.V., 2008, pp.
21–30.
[3] A. Juels, D. Catalano, and M. Jakobsson, “Coercion-resistant electronic
elections,” in WPES’05, 4th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic
Society, V. Atluri, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, and R. Dingledine, Eds.,
Alexandria, USA, 2005, pp. 61–70.
[4] O. Spycher, R. Haenni, and E. Dubuis, “Coercion-resistant hybrid
voting systems,” in 4th International Workshop on Electronic Voting,
R. Krimmer and R. Grimm, Eds., Bregenz, Austria, 2010.
[5] L. F. Cranor and R. K. Cytron, “Design and implementation of a practical
security-conscious electronic polling system,” Washington University,
Tech. Rep. WUCS-96-02, 1996.
[6] R. Haenni, E. Dubuis, and U. Ultes-Nitsche, “Research on e-voting
technologies,” Bern University of Applied Sciences, Tech. Rep. 5, 2008
.
[7] J. Benaloh and D. Tuinstra, “Receipt-free secret-ballot elections,” in
STOC’94, 26th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
Montre´al, Canada, 1994, pp. 544–553.
[8] J. Skripsky, “Minimal models for receipt-free voting,” Semester Project,
ETH Zu¨rich, 2002.
[9] S. Delaune, S. Kremer, and M. Ryan, “Coercion-resistance and receipt-
freeness in electronic voting,” in CSFW’06: 19th IEEE workshop on
Computer Security Foundations, Venice, Italy, 2006, pp. 28–42.
[10] H. L. Jonker and E. P. Vink, “Formalizing receipt-freeness,” in ISC’06,
9th Information Security Conference, ser. LNCS 4176, Samos, Greece,
2006, pp. 476–488.
[11] T. Okamoto, “Receipt-free electronic voting schemes for large scale
elections,” in 5th International Security Protocols Workshop, ser. LNCS
1361, B. Christianson, B. Crispo, T. M. A. Lomas, and M. Roe, Eds.,
Paris, France, 1997, pp. 25–35.
[12] M. Hirt and K. Sako, “Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomor-
phic encryption,” in EUROCRYPT’00, International Conference on the
Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, ser. LNCS 1807,
G. Goos, J. Hartmanis, and J. van Leeuwen, Eds., Bruges, Belgium,
2000, pp. 539–556.
[13] E. Magkos, M. Burmester, and V. Chrissikopoulos, “Receipt-freeness
in large-scale elections without untappable channels,” in I3E’01, 1st
IFIP Conference on towards the E-Society, B. Schmid, K. Stanoevska-
Slabeva, and V. Tschammer, Eds., vol. 202, 2001, pp. 683–694.
[14] B. Lee, C. Boyd, E. Dawson, K. Kim, J. Yang, and S. Yoo, “Providing
receipt-freeness in mixnet-based voting protocols,” in ICISC’03, 6th
International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ser.
LNCS 2971, G. Goos, J. Hartmanis, and J. van Leeuwen, Eds., Seoul,
South Korea, 2003, pp. 245–258.
[15] Z. Xia and S. Schneider, “A new receipt-free e-voting scheme based
on blind signature,” in WOTE’06, IAVoSS Workshop on Trustworthy
Elections, Cambridge, U.K., 2006, pp. 127–135.
[16] T. Moran and M. Naor, “Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with
everlasting privacy,” in CRYPTO’06, 26th Annual International Cryptol-
ogy Conference on Advances in Cryptology, ser. LNCS 4117, C. Dwork,
Ed., Santa Barbara, USA, 2006, pp. 373–392.
[17] S. S. M. Chow, J. K. Liu, and D. S. Wong, “Robust receipt-free election
system with ballot secrecy and verifiability,” in NDSS’08, 15th Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium, San Diego, USA, 2008,
pp. 81–94.
[18] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin, “Secure dis-
tributed key generation for discrete-log based cryptosystems,” in EU-
ROCRYPT’99, International Conference on the Theory and Application
of Cryptographic Techniques, ser. LNCS 1592, J. Stern, Ed., Prague,
Czech Republic, 1999, pp. 295–310.
[19] E. Bangerter, “Efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for homo-
morphisms,” Ph.D. dissertation, Fakulta¨t fu¨r Elektrotechnik und Infor-
mationstechnik, Ruhr-Universita¨t Bochum, Germany, 2005.
[20] C. P. Schnorr, “Efficient signature generation by smart cards,” Journal
of Cryptology, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 161–174, 1991.
[21] D. Chaum and T. P. Pedersen, “Wallet databases with observers,”
in CRYPTO’92, 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on
Advances in Cryptology, ser. LNCS 740, E. F. Brickell, Ed., Santa
Barbara, USA, 1992, pp. 89–105.
[22] D. Chaum, “Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital
pseudonyms,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 84–88,
1981.
[23] S. Schechter, T. Parnell, and A. Hartemink, “Anonymous authentication
of membership in dynamic groups,” in FC’99, 3rd International Con-
ference on Financial Cryptography, ser. LNCS 1648, M. K. Franklin,
Ed., Anguilla, British West Indies, 1999, pp. 184–195.
[24] K. Sako, S. Yonezawa, and I. Teranishi, “Anonymous authentication:
For privacy and security,” NEC Journal of Advanced Technology, vol. 2,
no. 1, pp. 79–83, 2005.
[25] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Communications of the ACM,
vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612–613, 1979.
